This paper investigates the relation between ownership structure and firm value across a sample of 5,284 firm years of China's partially privatized former state-owned enterprises (SOE) from 1991-2001. We find that state and institutional shares are significantly negatively related to Tobin's Q, and that significant convex relations exist between Q and state shares, as well as between Q and institutional shares. We also find that foreign ownership is significantly positively related to Tobin's Q. We test for potential endogeneity of ownership, and find that Q and state/foreign ownership are not jointly determined. We also test for time-series, industry, and geo-economic location effects, and find our results to be robust.
I. Introduction
The relation between corporate ownership structure and firm value has been the subject of numerous studies, dating back to Berle and Means (1932) . Central to this analysis is the agency theory that explains the conflict of interest between inside corporate decision makers and outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). Most studies since Jensen and Meckling have focused on firms located in the U.S. or a few developed countries.' The existing empirical evidence on this subject is far from conclusive and at times the results are conflicting. Ŝ everal recent articles study corporate governance in emerging (or transition) economies, focusing on the relation between ownership structure and firm "* La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) argue that agency problems in many emerging markets are relatively more severe due to the absence of strong legal protections and other governance mechanisms. Claessens and Djankov (1999) examine firms in the Czech Republic and find that firm profitability and labor productivity are both positively related to ownership concentration. Anderson, Lee, and Murrell (2000) study Mongolia's mass privatization and find that enterprises with residual state ownership appear to be more efficient than other enterprises. They argue that in an environment that lacks the very basic institutions of capitalism the government is pressured to focus on efficiency in order to give credibility to its reform programs.
More recently, Dyck and Zingales (2004) study private benefits of control around the world and find that higher private benefits of control are associated with less developed capital markets and more concentrated ownership. Lins (2003) investigates whether managerial stock ownership and non-management block holdings are related to firm value across a sample of 1,433 firms from 18 emerging economies. This study finds that firm values are lower in situations where a management group's control rights exceed its cash flow rights and firm values are higher in situations where non-management control rights block holdings are large. Lemmon and Lins (2003) use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian economies to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crises. They find that the crises increased the incentives of insiders to expropriate outside minority investors and that insiders have the ability to engage in this expropriation.
For at least three reasons, China provides an excellent laboratory to study the relation between ownership structure and firm value. First, Chinese share issue privatization (SIP) is an ongoing program.^ Managing the huge state holdings in China's listed companies has become a top government priority. This is evidenced by the recent upgrade of the State Asset Management Bureau (S AMB) to a ministerial level agency called State Asset Monitoring and Management Commission (SAMMC). This agency is vastly more powerful than its predecessor, charged with managing about RMB6,900 billion of state assets (including about RMB3,000 billion of state shares in the privatized firms) and 196 enterprises that are wholly owned by the central government. *
The primary focus of the Commission is to restructure state holdings in the privatized firms. The goal is to gradually reduce state shares in the non-strategic industries from the current level of 35%-36% to approximately 20% in the next few years, while adjusting holdings in the strategic industries, such as public utilities, transportation, metallurgy, and heavy industry. ^ Given the ongoing nature Denis and McConnell (2003) for a comprehensive review of corporate governance around the world.
' 'Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Svejnar (2002) provide comprehensive reviews of enterprise restructuring in transition economies.
'The ruling Chinese Communist Party and its official media never use the term "privatization" in reference to the ownership reform of its state-owned enterprises, tnstead, they use such terms as corporatization and shareholding system, among others. To be consistent with the existing literature concerning government sales or partial sales of state ownership to private investors, we use privatization, partial privatization, or share issue privatization interchangeably in this paper.
Beijing Morning News. of the Chinese program, this research is timely in helping researchers and policymakers better understand China's privatization program.
Second, most of the studies cited above use managerial/insider ownership as the measure of ownership structure. China's SIP, on the other hand, has created different classes of shares, namely state, institutional, foreign, insider, individual, and employee shares. These shareholders are different in their interests in the firm and their incentives and ability to monitor management. China's SIP has altered ownership structure of a former state-owned firm, and the ownership structure that ultimately emerges should be the outcome influenced by these different interests. An important question to be addressed in this study is whether this altered ownership structure (thus, privatization per se) is consistent with value maximization.
Third, unlike in developed economies, corporate governance in China is in the early stage of development and can be characterized as having weak shareholder protection and underdeveloped markets for corporate control. ^ Managerial/insider stock ownership in China is minimal and insiders can gain control either through direct government appointments or indirect political influence. We argue that agency problems in China are more severe due to the relatively large separation of control rights and cash flow rights by insiders and weak legal protection of outside shareholders. In many studies concerning the U.S. and other developed economies, cross-sectional managerial/insider ownership variation can explain only a small fraction of the variation in firm value.' Another question to be addressed in this study is: How much variation in firm value can be explained by cross-sectional variation in ownership structure in China's privatized firms?
In this paper, we use a large sample of 5,284 firm years of China's privatized former state-owned firms listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges from 1991-2001 to study how the conflicts of interest among different block shareholders affect firm value. '^ Our empirical results show that both state and institutional shares are significantly negatively related to firm value, as proxied by Tobin's Q, and that the relations between state ownership and Q, as well as between institutional ownership and Q, are significantly convex. We also find that foreign ownership is significantly positively related to Q. We test for potential endogeneity between ownership and firm value, and find that the direction of causality runs from state/foreign ownership to Q, but not vice versa.
The next section briefly discusses China's SIP and the resulting ownership structure. Section III describes the data and summary statistics of relevant variables, while Section IV discusses the methodology and describes the empirical results. Section V conducts tests for robustness and Section VI concludes.°L in (2000) presents an in-depth discussion of corporate governance development in China. 'For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) report an ownership-performance relation, but it explains only 2% of the cross-sectional variation in performance; McC^onnell and Servaes (1990) find the ownership variation can explain only 3% in 1976 and 6% in 1986 of the variation in performance.
'" ) use Shanghai-listed firms in 1994 -1996 to examine the relation between a firm's market performance and ownership structure and find that Tobin's Q is significantly negatively related to state shares and that institutional and foreign ownership have inconclusive effects on firm performance.
II. China's Share Issue Privatization and Ownership Structure A. China's Share Issue Privatization Program
Since its initiation in 1978, China's economic reform has entered the third decade." The establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991 marked an important milestone of Chinese economic reform, helping to institutionalize China's share issue privatization (SIP) of former state-owned enterprises (SOE). Through SIP, China listed 10 companies in 1990, and the number grew to 1,160 by the end of 2001. These 1,160 companies had raised cumulative capital of RMB780 billion (U.S. $95 billion) over the period. By the end of 2000, there were over 54 million shareholders in China (Wei, Varela, D'Souza, and Hassan (2003) ).
China's program differs in two important aspects from privatization programs examined in Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh (1994) , Boubakri and Cosset (1998), and Megginson (1999) . First, the Chinese program involves exclusively primary, capital-raising issues, while SIPs in other countries are mostly secondary issues where proceeds go to the government as state revenues. Moreover, proceeds from primary issues are injected into the firm as fresh funds that are under management's discretionary control. This provides extra opportunities for management to pursue activities that may not be consistent with value maximization, such as unrelated diversifications, paying off short-term debt, channeling money to related entities that are not part of the listed company umbrella, or even engaging in expropriation for personal benefits. 'Ŝ econd, Chinese SIP can be characterized as being highly politicized. Several researchers have studied the politicization of privatizations. Perotti (1995) presents an IPO underpricing model under policy uncertainty. He illustrates that the government can retain a large stake in the privatized firms and use underpricing to sell partial ownership to the public in order to credibly signal its commitment to further privatization. Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999) find that privatizing governments routinely use allocation of shares as financial means to both political and economic ends. Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2001) study the priorities and sequencing of privatization in the Czech Republic and find the Czech government sequenced the privatization of its SOE in a way that is consistent with theories related to maximizing revenue and public goodwill. Biais and Perotti (2002) present a theoretical model that allows politicians to use privatization in a Machiavellian fashion, i.e., as a strategic policy to retain power.
The Chinese government has explicit objectives when privatizing its SOEs. These include raising capital for the firm, reducing government subsidies to the state sector, improving efficiency, optimizing industrial structure, and defining and clarifying property rights. '^ However, given that China is still fundamentally a socialist country ruled by the Communist Party, political considerations always "For studies investigating the Chinese economic reform, see Groves, Hong, McMillion, and Naughton (1994), (1995) , Naughton (1995) , Bai, Li, and Wang (1997) , Li (1997) , Lin, Cai, and Li (1998), and Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) , among others.
'^We thank the referee for pointing out this important characteristic of China's SIP.^C hinese Securities Market Yearbook 1994, p. 52.
trump other objectives. This is evidenced by the government's absolute control over the core, strategic enterprises (the so-called "red chips"). Control over the red chips is never contestable. Furthermore, firms selected for listing are rarely based on economic merit, attractiveness to investors, or the need for capital, but are instead the result of a highly politicized rotation of companies from different regions and party power bases. The State Planning Commission, in conjunction with China's central bank (the People's Bank of China) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), determines a quota for new firms to be listed each year. The quota is then allocated among the provinces and regions (Su and Fleisher (1999) ). Moreover, the process is severely restrictive in that far more companies could successfully issue shares each year than the quota allows. The adage that "politics trumps economics" is operant in the Chinese privatization program.'"
B. Ownership Structure of China's Privatized Firms
A typical privatized firm in China has six types of shares: state, institutional (or legal person), foreign, insider, employee, and individual shares (A shares). The latter three types of shares are too diffuse and/or too insignificant to have any collective effect on firm value. Insider shares are shares owned by senior managers and directors, and account for an average of only 0.015% of total shares in our sample firms. A typical upper manager owns a few hundred to a few thousand shares out of hundreds of millions of total shares issued. Unlike in other countries, insider stock ownership in China is too small to be used as a measure of ownership structure and has not been used to align the confiicting interests between insiders and outside shareholders. This gives rise to the large separation of cash flow rights and control rights by insiders. Despite owning almost no cash fiow rights, corporate insiders often gain control over a firm. The benefits of control are small in monetary terms since Chinese managers are paid substantially less than their counterparts in the U.S. and other developed markets. However, other non-pecuniary benefits can be large, such as social prestige, housing allowances, free use of corporate cars, luxury hotel stays and expensive meals, and foreign travel using corporate funds.
Employee shares account for only 1.75% of the total shares in our sample, and in most cases, they are restricted shares (non-tradable for a period of time, typically a year). We also believe these shares are too small to have any collective effect on firm value. Individual shares (A shares) are tradable shares and are owned by individual investors with mainland Chinese residency. These individual investors are very diverse and diffused and may not have personal incentives and mechanisms to effectively monitor management of the firm.
On the other hand, state, institutional, and foreign shares are relatively more concentrated. These shareholders have different interests in the firm and their incentive and ability to monitor the management also differ. As such, in this study, our focus is on state, institutional, and foreign shares and their effects on firm value.
State shares are either shares retained by the state or shares issued to the state through debt-equity swap when privatizing a SOE. Theoretically, these shares are owned by all residents of China and the state acts as an agent to look after the people's best interest. In firms with high state ownership, insiders gain control either through direct government appointments or indirect political influence, despite owning few or no cash flow rights. It is plausible to argue that the higher the state ownership, the larger the separation between insiders' cash flow rights and control rights. Therefore, we use state ownership as our main ownership structure measure and as a proxy for agency problems between insiders and outside shareholders in China's privatized firms.
Institutional shares (also called "legal person" shares) are shares owned by Chinese domestic legal entities, including domestic mutual funds, insurance companies, government agencies, and other enterprises. Many of these legal entities are fully or partially owned by different levels of government (provincial, municipal, or county). State shares and institutional shares are similar in that they may be directly or indirectly owned by different levels of government and that there are inherent agency problems associated with both types of shares. However, there is one important distinction in terms of their primary interest in the firm. The state's primary interest may be more political than monetary, such as maintaining employment levels or control over certain strategic industries. Institutional shareholders are more profit-oriented and may have more incentives to monitor the firm. Given these two opposing forces, the effect of institutional shares on firm value remains an empirical question.
Eoreign shares are shares owned by investors with non-mainland Chinese residency, including foreign investors and residents of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Currently, foreign shares include B shares and H shares. B shares are renminbi-denominated shares listed on either of the two Chinese stock exchanges. Prior to February 2001, B shares could be subscribed to and traded only by foreign investors and residents of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Transactions are made in U.S. dollars for B shares listed in Shanghai and in Hong Kong dollars for those listed in Shenzhen. H shares are shares issued by Chinese firms and traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. On average, foreign equity ownership has declined from 7.1% in 1993 to 2.7% in 2001 (Table 1) . However, among the firms that issued foreign shares, the average foreign ownership is 28.2% for our pooled sample.'Î
II. Data and Summary Statistics
The data for this study was obtained from the CSMAR Databases, commercially available at Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company Ltd. Our initial sample included all firms traded on either of China's two stock exchanges for the period 1991-2001. We adjusted the sample by deleting financial firms, firms with less than six months of trading data, and firms with negative book equity values. Our final sample includes 5,284 firm years for the period 1991-2001. ei, Varela, D'Souza, and Hassan (2003) The summary statistics of the relevant variables are presented in Table 1 . Our primary valuation measure, Tobin's Q, is computed as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt, all divided by book value of assets. We censored Tobin's Q at the first and 99th percentiles to alleviate the influence of extreme outliers. The summary statistics show that the average value of Tobin's Q ranges from 1.66 in 1995 to 3.83 in 2000. The overall (pooled) mean value of Tobin's Q is 2.92 in our study, which is substantially higher than 1.52, the average Q value for firms in the 18 developing countries examined by Lins (2003) . Given that Tobin's Q is widely used as a proxy for a firm's growth opportunities, our higher average Q may be explained by the fact that China's GDP growth rate over the past decade is much higher than that in other countries in Lins' sample. Table 1 reports the summary statistios for each year from 1991-2001 and the pooled sample. Tobin's 0 is computed as the sum of marl<et value of equity and book value of debt divided by bock value of assets. State Shares, institutional Shares, and Foreign Shares are measured as fractions cf total ccmmon shares. Assets and Saies are in miilions of reminbi (RMB). Return en Sales is computed by dividing totai saies intc after tax net income. Ail variabies are year-end mean vaiues. Table 1 also presents the mean values of state, institutional, and foreign ownership, as well as the mean values of total assets and sales. The average state ownership ranges from 20.6% in 1992 to 33.4% in 2001, with an overall mean (pooled) of 30.9%. The average institutional ownership ranges from 26.9% in 2001 to 33.8% in 1993, with an overall mean (pooled) of 29.8%. The average foreign ownership ranges from 0% in 1991 to 7.1% in 1993, with an overall mean (pooled) of 3.7%. The overall (pooled) mean values of assets and sales are RMB1,541 million and RMB841 million, respectively. As an alternative performance measure, retum on sales (ROS) fluctuates wildly during our sampling period, from a high of 45.0% in 1993 to -4.5% in 2001.
In addition, we present ownership structure by industry in Table 2 . Using the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) industry classification, our sample firms are classified into 16 industries. "* As Table 2 shows, ownership structure is vastly different from industry to industry. For instance, public utilities, food and beverage, construction, and metallurgy industries have relatively high state ownership with more than 40% on average. These industries also have relatively low institutional ownership, less than 20% on average. In contrast, elec-'*Web site: http://www.csrc.gov.cn tronic and computer firms, agribusinesses, and conglomerates have relatively low state but high institutional ownership. Light industry has the highest average foreign ownership of 8.5%, followed by transportation and heavy machinery. Public utilities, petrochemical, construction, metallurgy, transportation, and energy are considered strategic industries and, as expected, these industries on average have relatively high state ownership after SIP. Tabie 2 presents the summary statistics of ownership structure by industry. State is the mean fraction of equity ownership owned by the Chinese government; Institute is the mean fraction of domestic institutional ownership; and Foreign is the mean fraction of equity shares owned by foreign investors and residents of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, Sum is the sum of aii equity shares owned by state, institutional, and foreign investors. The balance of shares is owned by individual shareholders with Chinese residenoe. including shares owned by managers and employees.
IV. Methodology and Empirical Results

A. Methodology
The three ownership types described above, namely state, institutional, and foreign shares, are the main explanatory variables employed in our study. We begin our analysis using OLS to explain variations in Tobin's Q as a function of ownership types. We study the effects of state and institutional ownership in separate regression equations because state and institutional ownership are highly correlated and result in severe multicollinearity if both are included in one regression equation.'Ŵ e also study the combined effect of state and institutional ownership on firm value by using their sum as an independent variable. State and institutional ownership are similar in that many ofthe legal entities that own these institutional shares are fully or partially owned by different levels of government. They are also distinctively different in terms of their interests in the firm and their incentives to monitor management of the firm. However, it is of interest to see what their combined effect is on firm value.
"The correlation coefficient between state shares and institutional shares is -0.871 for the pooled sample in our study.
Both theories have predicted and empirical evidence has shown that the relation between ownership and firm value is nonlinear (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) , McConnell and Servaes (1990) , Loderer and Martin (1997), and Lins (2003) ), Following Loderer and Martin (1997) , we include the squared values of state and institutional ownership as independent variables to capture the potential nonlinear relation between ownership and performance.
We control for firm size by using the logarithm of total assets. Other researchers have also controlled for leverage (Lins (2003) ), A problem with including leverage as an independent variable is that capital structure has a two-way relation with performance; moreover, leverage could be a function of state ownership in China's privatized firms. When privatizing a SOE, the state may convert, through a debt-equity swap, all or part of the debt owed the government into shares in the privatized firm to reduce the debt burden (Sun and Tong (2003) ), Including leverage would therefore require substantial expansion of our study to examine the interdependence among state ownership, leverage, and performance. Though an excellent topic for future research, this is clearly beyond the scope of our paper. Our primary purpose in this study is to investigate the relation between ownership and firm value. Excluding leverage brings more focus to our paper.
The OLS equations are specified as follows:
ased on theoretical and empirical evidence, we hypothesize the signs of the coefficients as follows, p\ is expected to be negative in equation (1) because state ownership is detrimental to firm value, '^ /3i in equation (2) can be positive or negative. Institutional ownership may behave like state ownership because many of the legal entities that own shares are partially or fully owned by different levels of government. On the other hand, institutional shareholders have mostly monetary (profit) interest in the firm while the state may have other motives, such as political interests. We further hypothesize /3| in equation (3) to be negative. It is plausible that the combined state and institutional ownership may behave more like state shares.
The sign for /32, the coefficient of the squared ownership term, is indeterminate. The purpose of including this term is to capture any potential non-linear relation between ownership and firm value. There is no empirical or theoretical guidance in hypothesizing the sign of P2. Empirical evidence points to a positive sign for ^3, the coefficient for foreign ownership (Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997) ), We use log of total assets to control for firm size. We argue that the '^Empirical evidence overwhelmingly points to the negative effect of state ownership on efficiency (see Boardman and Vining (1989) , Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) , Megginson and Netter (2001) , among others). However, Anderson, Lee, and Murrell (2000) and Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2001) find that, in transition economies that lack the basic capitalistic institutions, state ownership can have a positive impact on efficiency.
bigger the firm, the more severe the agency problem. Thus, the sign of /J4, the coefficient of size, is expected to be negative.
B, Effect of State Ownership on Firm Value
In this section, we conduct tests that consider the relation between state ownership and firm value (equation (1)), The empirical results are presented in Table  3 , Panel A," For each of the nine years and the pooled sample, we document that state equity ownership is significantly negatively related to Tobin's Q, and the results are all significant at the 1% level,^° This finding is consistent with our hypothesis and can be in part explained by the inherent agency problems associated with public ownership (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) ),
The results also show that the relation between state ownership and Tobin's Q is significantly convex throughout,^' The reflection points range from 31,0% in 1995 to 36,7% in 1993, with a pooled average of 35,7% (Table 3 , Panel A), This convex relation may be explained as follows. When privatizing a former state-owned firm, the government systematically reduces the state ownership. At a level above the reflection point, investors may not be convinced that the government is fully committed to privatization and market monitoring. In the absence of a competitive property rights market and a well-functioning legal framework, partial privatization may be detrimental to firm value due to expropriation of public assets by insiders. Therefore, firm value declines as state ownership decreases.
As the government continues to reduce its stake in the privatized firm to below the reflection point, market discipline and monitoring become effective in reducing agency costs. Therefore, after some point, firm value increases as state shares decline,^T he results further show that, for eight out of the nine years, foreign ownership is significantly positively related to firm value, ^^ This finding may indicate that foreign investors can monitor and positively influence management of the firm. It may also indicate that the presence of foreign ownership forces management to act more consistently with firm value maximization. Foreign ownership allows access to international capital markets and hard currency and, in turn, access to advanced technology and international managerial talents. Preserving this access is beneficial to shareholders. The adjusted R^ statistics show that the independent variables combined can explain a substantial amount of the variation in firm value, ranging from 13,2% in 1996 to 47,1% in 2001, "The results of 1991 and 1992 are not included because the number of observations (nine and 25, respectively) for these two years are too small for OLS regression, "Wei, Varela, D'Souza, and Hassan (2003) , and Sun and Tong (2003) study performance changes in China's privatized firms, and find that state equity ownership is significantly negatively related to efficiency gains pre-versus post-privatization, 'McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a significant concave relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q,^T ian (2003) studies 826 listed Chinese firms from 1994-1998 and finds a similar U-shaped relation between firm value and state ownership, Tian argues that the government has both the "grabbing hand" and the "helping hand" in these partially privatized firms,^I n their study of 3,792 privatized firms in Slovenia, Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997) find that foreign ownership is significantly positively related to profitability. Table 3 , Panel B presents empirical results of the regression that investigates the relation between institutional ownership and firm value (equation (2)). The results show that institutional ownership is negatively related to firm value and that the results for five of nine years plus the pooled sample are significant Panel C reports the OLS regression coefficients, /-statistics (in parentheses), number of observations, adjusted R^. Fstatistics, p-vaiue, and the refieotion point of the U-shaped curve. LogTA is the iogarithm of total assets; Foreign is the fraction of shares owned by residents outside mainiand China, including foreign nationais, residents of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan; (State-i-lnstitutional) = combined fraction of shares owned by the central government and domestic Chinese iegai entities; (State+lnstitutionai)^ = the squared vaiue of (State+lnstitutionai).
C. Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Value
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% ievels, respectively.
at the 1% level. This shows that state shares and institutional shares behave similarly in that they are negatively related to firm value. This finding may be attributed to the fact that many of these legal entities are fully or partially owned by different levels of government. The results also document an overall significant convex relation between institutional ownership and Tobin's Q, with an average (pooled) reflection point of 22.5%. However, the convex relation between institutional ownership and Q is quite different from that between state shares and Q. Figure 1 compares and contrasts these two convex relations. As Figure 1 shows, the main difference is the direction of ownership changes. When the government share issue privatizes an SOE, state ownership decreases from 100%, whereas institutional ownership increases from 0%. Below the reflection point, firm value is low because institutional shareholders lack the incentives and mechanisms to monitor management. When institutional ownership increases above the reflection point, institutional shareholders have the incentive and ability to positively influence activities at the firm level. Thus, above the reflection point, firm value increases as institutional ownership increases. The adjusted R^ statistics show that the independent variables combined can explain a substantial amount of the variation in firm value, ranging from 11.3% in 1996 to 47.0% in 2001. 
D. The Combined Effect of State and Institutional Ownership on Firm Value
As mentioned earlier, state and institutional shares are similar yet different. They are similar in that they are owned by different levels of government. They are different in their primary interest in the firm as well as their incentives and ability to monitor management. It is plausible that institutional shareholders have greater incentives and better mechanisms to monitor management. Their interest is more aligned with value maximization than that of the state, which may have political motives in the tirm, such as preserving employment levels (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) ).
To test the combined effect of state and institutional ownership on tirm value, we use the sum of state and institutional ownership and its squared value as independent variables (equation (3)). The results are presented in Table 3 , Panel C.
The results show, for each of the nine years plus the pooled sample, the combined state and institutional shares are signiticantly negatively related to Tobin's Q and that the relation is a convex one with an overall reflection point of 21.1%. Comparing the results from Table 3 , Panels A, B, and C, we find that this combined effect is nonlinear. State and institutional ownership behave differently in affecting firm value. The adjusted R^ statistics show this regression specification can explain substantial amounts ofthe variation in firm value, ranging from 14.0% in 1996 to 51.7% in 2001.
V. Robustness Tests A. Endogeneity of Ownership-State Ownership versus Q
Our OLS results may be biased if ownership and firm value are endogenously determined. If ownership and firm value are jointly determined, it would be biased to use cross-sectional OLS results to make inferences about the causahty of the relation. For instance, the negative relation between state ownership and firm value documented in Table 3 , Panel A may indicate that higher state ownership causes higher agency costs, thus lower firm value. It is also plausible that higher firm value may induce the government to sell more state shares to private investors.
To test the endogeneity of ownership, we adopt the cross-sectional framework of Loderer and Martin (1997) . This model consists of two equations to determine firm performance (Q) and the fraction of state ownership (State) in the privatized firms,
Tobin's Q in equation (5) and state ownership (State) in equation (4) are jointly dependent variables, and log of total assets (LogTA), strategic industry dummy (SID), and foreign ownership (Foreign) are exogenous variables (instruments). The system meets the order condition and is just identified, as the number of zero coefficients in equations (5) and (4) is one, because the coefficient for SID is zero in the former and the coefficient for Foreign is zero in the latter.
We use a two-stage least square (2SLS) procedure to estimate the above model, which allows for endogeneity between Q and State. However, the 2SLS technique requires the identification of exogenous variables that plausibly affect only firm value or ownership, but not both. Given our dataset, we identify the strategic industry variable (SID) and foreign ownership (Foreign) as our exogenous variables. When deciding the level of state ownership, the government takes into account whether the firm is in a strategic or important industry. Thus, we argue that SID affects State but not Q. We also argue that foreign ownership affects Q but not State. Table 4 , Panel A presents yearly cross-sectional and pooled cross-sectional time-series 2SLS results for equation (4), where State is regressed against QHAT, the predictor of Q from the first-stage regression, as well as LogTA and SID. The coefficients for QHAT for eight of the nine years plus the pooled sample are insignificant, indicating that firm perfonnance is not an important determinant of state ownership in China's privatized firms. The coefficients for SID are positive and significant in seven of the nine years plus the pooled sample, indicating that a firm's strategic industry status remains an important determinant of the state's ownership interest. The coefficients of LogTA are positive and significant in only three of the nine years. This shows that, overall, firm size is not a significant determinant of state ownership in the privatized firms. Table 4 , Panel B presents annual cross-sectional and pooled cross-sectional time-series 2SLS results for equation (5), where Tobin's Q is regressed against Panel A reports the 2SLS regression coefficients, (-statistics (in parentheses below the coefficients), number of observations, adjusted R^. F-statistics. and p-value of tho regression. QHAT is the predictor of Tobin's Q from the first-stage regression; LogTA is the logarithm of total assets; SID is the strategic industry dummy variable, equals one if a firm belongs to one of the five strategic industries (energy, iron and steel, oil refinery and petrochemicals, communications, and heavy machinery). Panel B reports the 2SLS regression coefficients, f-statistics (in parentheses below the coefficients), number of observations, adjusted fl^. F-statistics. and p-value of the regression. StateHAT is the predictor of state equity ownership from the first-stage regression; LogTA is the logarithm of total assets; SID is the strategic industry dummy variable, equals one if a firm belongs to one of the five strategic industries (energy, iron and steel, oil refinery and petrochemicals, communications, and heavy machinery).
Panel B. Two-Stage Least Square Estimates with Tobin's Q as the Dependent Variable
-. --. -indicate significance at the 1%. 5%. and 10% levels, respectively
StateHAT, the predictor of state ownership from the first-stage regression, as well as LogTA and Foreign. The coefficients for StateHAT are negative and significant in seven of the nine years plus the pooled sample. The coefficients of LogTA are all negative and significant at the 1% level, similar to the OLS results. In conjunction with the findings in Table 4 , Panel A, these results suggest that state ownership and firm value are not simultaneously determined. Hence, the conclusions we draw from the OLS analysis are robust to model specifications.
The difficulty of disentangling endogeneity of ownership structure, investment opportunities, and firm value has caused problems in many of the studies using U.S. firms (Lemmon and Lins (2003) ). In China's privatized firms, endogeneity between state ownership and firm value is less severe, as is supported by our analysis. When the government decides state ownership in the privatized firms, it may not take into account the performance of the firm. It is unlikely that the state increases or reduces its ownership based on firm performance. The most important determinant of state ownership is the strategic status of the firm. Both the empirical results of this study and anecdotal evidence, such as official newspaper articles, support this.^"*
B. Endogeneity of Ownership-Foreign Ownership versus O
The OLS results regarding foreign ownership and firm value may be biased if a bi-directional causality exists between foreign ownership and Q. It could be that foreign investors are attracted to better performing firms, thereby inducing a positive relation between foreign ownership and Q, rather than foreign ownership per se creating value through monitoring or insisting on good corporate governance.
To test this potential endogeneity between foreign ownership and firm value, we again adopt the cross-sectional framework of Loderer and Martin (1997) , and the model is specified as follows, (6) Foreign = /3o + 721Q + /321 LogTA+ fe RICH,
Foreign ownership (Foreign) in equation (6) and Tobin's Q in equation (7) are jointly dependent variables. We control for firm size using the log of total assets (LogTA). The 2SLS technique requires the identification of exogenous variables that plausibly affect only firm value or foreign ownership, but not both. Given our dataset, we identify RICH, the geo-economic dummy variable for China's economically more developed regions, including Beijing and the coastal regions as one of our exogenous variables. ^^ Since the start of China's economic reform, foreign investment has been attracted to these regions. ^* Thus, we argue that RICH in equation (6) affects foreign ownership, but not Q. The second exogenous variable is state ownership (State). We argue that State in equation (7) affects Q, but not Foreign. Table 5 , Panel A presents yearly cross-sectional 2SLS results for equation (6), where Foreign is regressed against QHAT, the predictor of Q from the firststage regression, as well as LogTA and RICH. The coefficients for QHAT are statistically insignificant for all nine years plus the pooled sample, indicating that firm performance is never an important determinant for foreign ownership in our sample firms. '^Market News, March 10, 2003; Beijing Morning News, March II, 2003; Shanghai Securities Daily, April 11, 2004; and People's Daily, June 7, 2003 and June 13, 2003. 'The cities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai and Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces, belong to the rich category; Liaoning, Jinlin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong, Hubei, and Hainan provinces, plus the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, belong to the mediutn rich category; the rest belong to the poor category. *In the early 1980s, most foreign direct investments (FDt) were attracted to the coastal regions of Guangdong and Fujian through the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Since the early 1990s, several large populated regions, such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin, have become favorites for FDIs and equity joint ventures (Chadee and Qiu (2001), p. 125) . In our pooled sample, the average foreign ownership for firms located in the rich regions is 5.1%, while the average is 2.6% for firms located elsewhere. (7), where Q is regressed against ForeignHAT, the predictor of state ownership from the first-stage regression, as well as LogTA and State. The coefficients for ForeignHAT are significant and positive five of the nine years. In conjunction with the findings in Table 5 , Panel A, the 2SLS results suggest that foreign ownership and firm value are not jointly determined. Hence, the conclusions we draw from the OLS analysis are robust to model specifications.
C. Time-Series Effects
During our sampling period of 1991-2001, China's macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, unemployment rates, and other global economic events (the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis) differ from year to year. These macro factors may cause time-series effects of ownership on firm value. To control for time-series effects, we assign year dummy variables to the pooled sample of 5,284 firm years. For example, year91 is the dummy variable for 1991 and equals one for all observations in 1991, and zero otherwise. We re-estimate the OLS regression equations (1), (2), and (3), and report the results in Table 6 (column a). The results are almost identical to those reported in Table 3 in terms of coefficient signs and levels of significance.
D. Industry Effects
As Table 2 shows, the ownership structure in China's privatized firms is vastly different from industry to industry. This gives rise to the potential industry effects of ownership on firm value. It can be argued that the effect for the same proportion of state or institutional ownership may be different in one industry than in others. To control for potential industry effects, we assign dummy variables for the 16 industries reported in Table 2 , and re-estimate the OLS equations (1), (2), and (3). The results are reported in Table 6 (column b), and are almost identical in signs and levels of significance as those reported in Table 2 , Panels A, B, and C.
E. Geo-Economic Locafion Effects
It is plausible that the effect on firm value for the same proportion of ownership may be different in economically more developed areas than in less developed ones.^^ Workers and managers who work in firms located in economically more developed areas may be better educated and more productive, even under the same ownership structure. These firms may also have better access to markets and capital. To control for the potential geo-economic location effects, we classify China into three regions based on the average GDP per capita for the period 1991-2001: rich (RICH), medium rich (MRICH), and poor regions. We assign dummy variables to firms located in different regions. RICH equals one if a firm is headquartered in the top 25th percentile and zero if elsewhere; MRICH equals one if a firm is headquartered in the middle 50th percentile and zero if elsewhere.^^ We then re-estimate the same OLS equations (1), (2), and (3). The results are reported in Table 6 (column c), and are almost identical in terms of coefficient signs and levels of significance to those reported in Table 2 , Panels A, B,and C.
F. Performance Measurement Issues
All of the studies mentioned herein used Tobin's Q to measure firm value, except Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , who use accounting profit. The main difference between these two measures is that Q, as a proxy for investment opportunities, is forward looking in that market value is a reflection of future operations; while ei, Varela, D'Souza, and Hassan (2003) find that firms headquartered in Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen experience greater improvements in real sales and sales efficiency pre-versus postprivatization than firms headquartered elsewhere in China.
*We obtained the GDP per capita figures from the official Web site of the National Bureau of Statistics of China: www.stats.gov.cn. Table 6 presents the robustness test results using the pooied sample of 5,284 firm years. We use year, industry, and geo-economic iocation dummy variabies to controi for time-series effects, industry effects, and geo-economic effects of ownership, respectiveiy (resuits not tabuiated to conserve space). No dummy is used for the ROS regression. The coefficients and (-statistics (in parentheses) are reported for the other regressors.
-,-,--indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
accounting profit is backward looking in that it is computed using historical accounting data. Another difference is who does the measuring. For Q, the market does the measuring through investors' trading of the stocks, while for accounting profit, the accountant does the measuring according to a set of standards.
We employ the commonly used accounting profit measure, ROS, as an alternative performance measure and repeat the regressions in equations (1), (2), and (3). The results are reported in Table 6 (column d). Our main hypothesis holds in that state ownership is found to be significantly negatively related to account profitability, and that a significant convex relation exists between state ownership and retum on sales. We also find that the combined state and institutional ownership is significantly negatively related to firm performance and that a significant convex relation exists between the combined state and institutional ownership and ROS. However, institutional ownership has inclusive effects on ROS. Moreover, the adjusted R^s are extremely low compared to those using Tobin's Q as a performance measure. This indicates the OLS specification employed for Tobin's Q does not have much predictive power for accounting profit.
VI. Conclusion
This paper investigates the relation between ownership structure and firm value in China's privatized firms across a sample of 5,284 firm years from 1991-2001. Unlike previous articles that study the relation between managerial/insider ownership and firm value, we investigate the ownership structures that emerge from China's SIP program and how they are related to firm value. More specifically, we study the relations between state equity ownership and firm value, and between institutional ownership and firm value. This paper contains significant and consistent results. First, we find that, for each of the nine years and the pooled sample, state ownership is negatively related to firm value and that the results are all significant at the 1% level. To a slightly less degree, we also find that institutional ownership is significantly negatively related to Tobin's Q. Second, we document significant convex relations between state ownership and Tobin's Q, and between institutional shares and Q. Third, we find that foreign ownership in China's privatized firms is significantly positively related to firm value.
